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COMIREX-M-66
20 March 1969

NRO & DIA REVIEWS COMPLETED

COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

*Approved for
4-2-70*

COMIREX-M-66
20 March 1969

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COMIREX meeting:

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Section IV (Action Items) cont.

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Provided to NRO

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Tabs

Tab A - none with this report

Page 24 Tab B -
for 19 March 1969

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Page 25 Tab C - Status Report, Reconnaissance Activities
North Vietnam--November 1968 - March 1969

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Special Briefing

Status of Reconnaissance Coverage of North Vietnam

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1. [] presented a comprehensive review and status report of reconnaissance coverage of North Vietnam since the 1 November 1968 bombing halt. He reported that his presentation had been prepared at the request of the Director, DIA, and was designed to provide a statistical and substantive overview of reconnaissance activities during the period 1 November 1968 through mid-March.

2. The briefing addressed the following subjects:

a. Current USIB and JCS requirements for North Vietnam, including an assessment of the objectives of such coverage.

b. A statistical report of the coverage acquired by satellite, drone, and SR-71 aircraft against the USIB search requirement.

c. A review of targets north of 19° N requiring weekly, twice monthly, and monthly coverage.

d. A review of coverage south of 19° N in the Panhandle Area with emphasis on logistic targets. This latter review included an assessment of tactical reconnaissance as well as drone and SR-71.

3. Major conclusions drawn from [] analysis are:

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a. Reconnaissance coverage of the North Vietnam Panhandle south of 19° N, while not being fully responsive to the frequencies specified by JCS/USIB, is considered adequate to monitor rehabilitation of the logistical net and to selectively sample traffic flow.

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b. JCS/USIB requirements for photo reconnaissance of North Vietnam north of 19° N are not being satisfied. While search coverage of remote areas every three weeks approaches fulfillment of the requirement, weekly search coverage of built-up areas and weekly coverage of selected priority targets fall far short of the specified requirements because of the adverse affects of weather on high altitude reconnaissance.

c. Weather poses the most difficult problem in the conduct of successful reconnaissance operations against North Vietnam. Based on extensive experience, we will almost certainly not be able to meet our requirements in all areas for all periods of the year by high altitude reconnaissance alone.

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e. Low level drone coverage provides a very high quality, but limited coverage capability against priority targets in North Vietnam. Narrow swath and a limited area of terrain accessibility are the primary system limitations.

f. The SR-71 provides the best capability for search coverage of North Vietnam. Weather, however, limits the capability of this system alone to satisfy our needs for coverage north of 19° N.

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4. At the conclusion of his presentation, [] reported that the Director, DIA, was interested in having COMIREX review the requirements for coverage of North Vietnam, the current status of their satisfaction, and the implications to certain currently stated USIB requirements. From this it was suggested that, if necessary, COMIREX could provide a status report with recommendations to USIB. It was agreed that the Office of the Chairman would conduct a review of North Vietnam requirements on behalf of the COMIREX and would provide suggestions as to revisions in the near future.

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5. Selected graphics used by [] are attached at Tab C.

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Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)

Approval of Minutes

1. COMREX-M-64 was approved. The following *changes made* changes should be noted:

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a. Page 7, paragraph 2. e. --the word HATCH in the first line does not require capitalization.

b. Page 19, paragraph 6--change next to last line to read Tab A instead of Annex A.

c. Page 23--first line at top of page--change accept to expect

d. Page 24, paragraph 20, line 10--change requirements to refinements.

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2. [Redacted]

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Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East

3. After confirming that no IDEALIST/TACKLE or FOOD FAIR missions were flown in the 14-20 March period, [Redacted] reported GIANT SCALE missions in the same period as follows:

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Mission No.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>Results</u>
19 Mar	GS 122	Cam Pha Port, Hon Gai Port, Kep Afld, Kep RR Yd, Phuc Yen Afld, Viet Tri, RR Yd, Yen Bai, Dien Bien Phu	Unknown
20 Mar	GS 123	Ho Chi Minh Afld, Xom Aplo, Ammo Stor, Viet Tri RR Yd, Lao Cai Lang Son, Dung Gang	Unknown

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4. During the period 14-20 March there were seven successful BUMPY ACTION missions; four were lost. The details, as provided by [] are summarized below.

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
14 Mar	Q523 (Low)	Nam Dinh TPP, Seg RR 4, RhuLy RR Yd, Bai Thuong Afld	MARS
14 Mar	Q511 (Low)	Kien An Afld, Cat Bi Afld	MARS
14 Mar	Q860(Low)	Cat Bi Afld, Haiphong Naval Fac.	LOST
15 Mar	Q515 (Low)	Hanoi Port Fac, Gia Lam Afld, SAM Site, 2023N 10623E	MARS
15 Mar	Q882 (Low)	Hanoi Complex	MARS
16 Mar	Q525 (Low)	SAM's 334, 331	MARS
16 Mar	Q887(Low)	Haiphong Nav. Base, Cat Bi Afld	MARS
17 Mar	Q881 (Low)	Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Nam Dinh TPP, Bac Mai Afld, Gia Lam Afld	LOST
18 Mar	Q516 (Low)	Rte 10, 1A & RR, Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Thanh Hoa Transp Pt	MARS
19 Mar	Q507 (Low)	Yen Vien RR Yd, Gia Lam Afld, Hanoi Port Fac., Bac Mai Afld	LOST
19 Mar	Q229 (High)	DMZ, Mu Gia Pass, Rte 15, Bai Thuong Afld	LOST

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5. [] reported overhead photographic missions designed to satisfy two major South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:

a. Coverage of Lines of Communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966). The number of LOC priority targets in North Vietnam and South China has been increased to 355. This increase resulted from the addition of targets in North Vietnam. Forty of these are military installations or spot targets and they have been added to Tab A.* The remainder of the targets are segments of transportation routes, rail, road, and water, which need to be watched. Because of the peculiar nature of these targets, they will not be included in Tab A but in the future this paragraph will contain a general comment on success in coverage and will note any intelligence of significance.

b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967, and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 6-12 March 1969. Four BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time period and considered successful have not been reported. No SSM activity was observed.

Report on Aircraft Activities--Cuba

6. [] reported GLASS LAMP coverage for the period 12-20 March as follows:

*During this period, there is no surveillance coverage and no Tab A is attached to this particular report.

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
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GLASS LAMP Activities

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
12 Mar	G073	Successful, 25.0% coverage
15 Mar	G074	Successful, 52.4% coverage

RECAP

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>NET</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE</u>
12 Mar	G073	25.0%	77.4%
15 Mar	G074	52.4	85.9%


Current reporting period extends from 17 Mar 69 through 11 May 69.

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7. [redacted] reported that for the 56-day period beginning 23 January 1969 nine GLASS LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 89 percent coverage of the area. During this period 165 of the [redacted] targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography, not including the most recent mission flown on 15 March.

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Section II (NPIC Report)

Mission Highlights

1. Using three experts in their respective fields, NPIC initiated a new type of report to COMIREX as a substitute for the reports on mission highlights which have been given during the past few months. The objective of the new reporting is to choose subjects of current interest and bring COMIREX up to date with pertinent photography or comments based on the analysis of recent photography. In this instance the subjects were the Sino-Soviet border, Launch Pad J at Tyuratam, and the SAWRFs.

a. In reporting on the Sino-Soviet border, [redacted] concentrated initially on Damansky Island. He showed pictures of the terrain illustrating that while it can be quite easily traversed from north to south it is difficult to move either west or east. [redacted]

[redacted] showed indications of general activity including preparing field positions, deployed tanks, and other signs of this general nature. [redacted] next moved to the area of Spassk Dalniy and reported that elements of a SCUD brigade had been observed near Kransniyy Kut, 20 miles from the China border. He observed that this brigade was equipped with the new wheeled TEL and that exercises were under way. Finally, and with reference to the entire Sino-Soviet border, [redacted] reported the present level of effort to study the extent and pattern of Soviet reconnaissance, both by helicopter and by conventional aircraft and including electronic reconnaissance as well as visual observation and photography.

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
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b. [] showed the most recent photograph of the missile associated with Launch Pad J at Tyuratam. He displayed a good view of a portion of the vehicle in a horizontal position approximately two miles from its pad. In reply to a question [] surmised that the missile was first seen over one year ago in December 1969 and has been erected on the pad at least three times since that date.

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c. [] noted that SAWRF #16 has been observed three nautical miles from Shanghai. This SAWRF is closer to a large city than any previously observed and is also unique in that it is virtually on the water at the mouth of the Yangtse River. This SAWRF was started in March 1966 but did not advance to the corridor stage until April 1968; mounding began November 1968. Photography clearly shows four large structures facing the coast. SAWRF # 14, eight nautical miles from Tien Tsin, is unique in that it has the only one of the 300 trapezoidal structures associated with SAWRFs which has a parapet. In reply to a question, [] advised that ten of the SAWRFs are rail served.


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2. Following [] briefing, the Chairman asked members whether they felt that this new information might suggest abandoning U-2 coverage of Cheng Chou in favor of photographing Sites 14 and 15--#16 is obviously too close to Shanghai. Members could see no really good reason for making such a switch.


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
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


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

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Section III (Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

Report from Data Base Working Group



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Section IV (Action Items)

Distribution Requirements for Airborne-Acquired Photography
(COMIREX-D-34. 6/1)

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1. The Executive Secretary noted that no member had requested that this distribution list be discussed at COMIREX. Some questions were asked by [redacted] and were satisfactorily answered by [redacted]. The new distribution list was considered approved.

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Abstracts for Exploitation Products Data File (EPDF)
(COMIREX-D-32. 3/3)

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2. As the Chairman's question as to whether [redacted] recommendations on abstracts for the EPDF were acceptable was met with no objection, the recommendations were considered approved.

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5. The DIA member wished to explore the problem of the inclusion of color further and asked specifically whether its inclusion had been the real reason for the malfunction on the last CORONA. [redacted] did not provide a direct answer but admitted that the decision to include color film just prior to launching a mission can present problems. He suggested that the most reasonable antidote is to give NRO adequate lead time rather than to suggest the inclusion of color on a short-fuse basis.

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
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Approval of Priorities for 1050 and Comments on Guidance Provided to NRO



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
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6. The Chairman noted that the guidance provided by ICRS to NRO for Mission 1050 had raised some question as to the balance between area coverage and coverage of specific targets. [redacted] said that in his opinion if the problem is studied on a realistic basis a hundred or so targets designated for specific coverage should have very little impact on the general search mission. [redacted] suggested that no further issue be made of the targets for 1050 but recommended that he be permitted to present to COMIREX a briefing on how NRO uses guidance in the light of new software for CORONA missions. The DIA member advised that he was quite well aware of the problems, would not object to the paper in front of COMIREX for Mission 1050, but strongly supported a briefing in the near future.

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7. COMIREX approved the ICRS requirements for 1050. [redacted] agreed to brief COMIREX on CORONA guidance problems on 27 March.

Use of KH-4 in Support of Earth Resources--Midwest Snow Coverage




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8. The Chairman reported that Dr. Steininger had requested KH-4 support in photographing the unusually heavy snow cover in the midwest. The Department of Interior wishes to get an estimate of the extent and size of snow coverage to assist it in anticipating the possibility of floods. [redacted] reported that there has been aircraft coverage including the use of [redacted] This had provided good information on the area covered by snow but was not sufficiently conclusive on depth of the snow coverage.

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
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9. [] reported that the area is programmed for 1050 coverage. [] observed that taking into consideration the film capacity of 1050 he would not anticipate a real problem except perhaps in competition with low priority areas and perhaps mapping and charting coverage. After [] reported that an adequate sample would consume one percent of the film, or less, the Chairman suggested that when a good weather opportunity presented itself on the mission a minimum burst of stereo photography should be attempted. [] agreed with the recommendation while cautioning that COMIREX must use due caution in considering such demands so as not to become enmeshed in policy precedents which it might be awkward to reverse at some later date. The Chairman agreed to a cautious approach while advocating that in arriving at decisions as to the best use of CORONA, we recognize the present pressure to satisfy earth resources requirements and give due attention to these when not in conflict with primary intelligence missions.

Support of Special Projects Office (Department of Interior) at [] (COMIREX-D-15.8/4 and COMIREX-M-64, page 21)

10. The Chairman referred to discussion of support for [] at the 27 February COMIREX meeting and reported that [] had submitted new requirements. The revised requirements have been turned over to the Chairman, MCGWG, for review and referral to COMIREX.

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Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

Planning Factors for the Exploitation of Reconnaissance Imagery:
National Reconnaissance Program, FY 1970-1974 (COMIREX-D-31.1/3)

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1. The DIA member noted that he was in favor of the paper but requested some clarification of the last sentence of the first paragraph. The suggested change was agreed and will be reflected in the published version of the paper. The Chairman, EXSUBCOM, requested also that all references to the T-X-1 be deleted. The Chairman next addressed the question of classification and reported that he was hopeful that present discussions with [redacted] would make it possible to release essential information to T-KH planners within the T-KH compartment.

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2. The Chairman suggested that Tabs A and B to the memorandum under discussion be studied in conjunction with Appendix N of the JIIRG report, especially Annex N-1 of this Appendix. [redacted] reminded COMIREX of the need for those responsible for imagery exploitation to be advised of oncoming programs in order to prepare forecasts for personnel and equipment needs and recommended that in this context those responsible for exploitation carefully study Tab B to see if the information is adequate for their needs. The Chairman noted that by the same token EXSUBCOM should advise COMIREX when it notes significant changes which might have an impact on those responsible for exploitation. The Chairman concluded with the recommendation that the memorandum be approved in substance, pending resolution of the problem of classification, and he suggested that it be rescheduled for discussion in approximately a month so that COMIREX may be advised of the adequacy of the information provided by EXSUBCOM and how the information is being used.

25X1A

20

25X1A

25X1

25X1A

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
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25X1



COMIREX-M-66
20 March 1969

25X1A


Revision of FY 1969 Basic Requirements Tasked to DIA
(COMIREX-D-31.4/24)

25X1

3. The DIA member informed COMIREX that the review conducted by DIA had reduced its basic production responsibility and recommended COMIREX acceptance of the revision. COMIREX agreed with the proposed DIA changes.

25X1

21



25X1A

25X1A

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COMIREX-M-66
20 Marcy 1969Section VI (Other Business)Briefing on Color Presented to ICRS by

1. [redacted] reported that [redacted] and [redacted] of CIA/OSP presented the ICRS a most comprehensive briefing covering the whole spectrum of color application - True color, bi-color, [redacted] covered the technical aspects of color and [redacted] addressed the application of color to specific intelligence problems. The briefing was well received at ICRS and it is recommended it be presented to COMIREX. The briefing takes approximately one hour and fifteen minutes.

Visit of IRT to Houston

2. The Chairman reported briefly on the visit of the IRT to Houston to view [redacted]. He mentioned the problems presented by the tracking of an unidentified object in space and expressed particular interest in getting an NPIC evaluation of the multi-sensor experiment. [redacted] also observed that the multi-sensor experiment had been the only aspect of the mission commented on adversely by the Soviets. The Soviets had referred to multi-sensor experimentation as being a form of espionage.

Editing of Cloud Cover from KH-4

3. The Chairman, EXSUBCOM, referred to a request some time ago by the DIA member for EXSUBCOM to investigate the possibility of editing out cloud cover frames from KH-4 photography in order to reduce the amount of film reproduced and stored. EXSUBCOM has studied the problem at length and has determined that, for a variety of reasons, it would not be practicable or cost effective to edit out the cloud cover.

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COMIREX-M-66
20 March 1969

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"A View From Space"

25X1

4. At the request of [redacted] a short section from an ABC television program of 9 February, sponsored by North American Rockwell, was shown to COMIREX. The section shown was a brief commentary by Mr. Jules Bergman addressed to the extent and efficacy of our satellite reconnaissance. It was the consensus of COMIREX that, while Mr. Bergman's remarks were provocative and unnecessary,

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

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25X1A

25X1A

5. [redacted] reported that, following the Executive Secretary's description of the entire show, a description confirmed by [redacted] he would like to show the TV movie to some of those particularly interested in earth resources. [redacted] undertook to arrange this.

25X1A

25X1A

Executive Secretary

Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachments

Tabs B & C

23

25X1

25X1A

25X1A

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25X1D

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STATUS REPORT

RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES NORTH VIETNAM

NOVEMBER 1968 - MARCH 1969

This briefing is classified:

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REQUIREMENTS

- **USIB-D-46.4/7 - 17 NOV 1967**
**“PHOTOGRAPHIC DETECTION OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE
SYSTEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM”**

- **JCS 2150/267 - 8 MAY 1968**
**“AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN NVN AFTER FURTHER
DE-ESCALATION AND/OR DURING COMPLETE CESSATION
OF BOMBARDMENT (TS)”**

- **USIB-D-46.4/23 - 17 OCT 1968**
**“OVERHEAD IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE OF
NORTH VIETNAM DURING A TRUCE”**

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OBJECTIVES

- **REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRBORNE IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ARE OPTIMIZED AGAINST THE FOLLOWING:**
 - LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO, AND BUILD-UP OF COMMUNIST FORCES THROUGHOUT NORTH VIETNAM
 - DEPLOYMENT OF INFILTRATION FORCES AND THE MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES TOWARD SOUTH VIETNAM
 - INTRODUCTION INTO NORTH VIETNAM OF NEW OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OR OTHER ADVANCED SYSTEMS
 - THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT
 - COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFIED PROVISIONS OF ANY TRUCE AGREEMENT

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SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

● **AREA COVERAGE**

1. **WEEKLY COVERAGE OF THE BUILT-UP AREAS**
2. **COVERAGE ONCE EVERY 3 WEEKS OF THE UNDER DEVELOPED AREAS**

● **PRIORITY TARGETS**

3. **WEEKLY COVERAGE OF SELECTED HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS**
4. **TWICE MONTHLY COVERAGE OF SELECTED MILITARY AND LOGISTICS TARGETS**
5. **MONTHLY COVERAGE OF SELECTED AIR DEFENSE FACILITIES**

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AREA COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS

- WEEKLY
- EVERY THREE WEEKS

PRIORITY TARGETS

- 3
- PORT

25X1

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WEATHER

- BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, WEATHER POSES THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN THE ORDERLY ACQUISITION OF PHOTOGRAPHY OF NORTH VIETNAM. IT HAS A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS IMPACT UPON SATELLITE COVERAGE AND, TO A LESSER AND VARIED DEGREE, UPON MANNED AND DRONE RECONNAISSANCE COVERAGE AS WELL. THE MAJOR FACTOR LIMITING HIGH ALTITUDE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE IS CLOUD COVER AT THE MIDDLE ALTITUDES. WHILE HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE HANOI AREA, FOR EXAMPLE, IS POSSIBLE ONLY TWO DAYS IN JUNE. LOW ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE IS POSSIBLE ON 20 DAYS IN JUNE. SIMILAR ANOMALIES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW ALTITUDE CLOUD PATTERNS ARE FOUND FOR THE PANHANDLE AREA AND THE NORTHWEST MOUNTAINOUS REGION.

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**AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS EACH MONTH
SUITABLE FOR HIGH AND LOW ALTITUDE PHOTOGRAPHY***

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
LAO KAY (NW MTNS)	HIGH	4.0	4.0	7.0	10.0	6.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	5.0	6.0	8.0	10.0
	LOW	6.0	5.0	9.0	11.0	12.0	9.0	9.0	14.0	14.0	18.0	12.0	13.0
HANOI	HIGH	5.3	3.5	3.8	3.6	2.8	2.0	1.9	1.8	4.0	9.1	5.9	9.7
	LOW	8.5	4.0	4.7	9.7	15.1	20.1	21.3	18.7	19.5	20.5	15.5	15.2
DONG HOI	HIGH	5.0	6.0	7.0	10.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	7.0	7.0	5.0
	LOW	8.0	8.0	11.0	17.0	20.0	20.0	21.0	19.0	14.0	15.0	11.0	10.0
VINH	HIGH	4.0	3.0	4.0	7.0	6.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	5.0
	LOW	6.0	8.0	4.0	11.0	18.0	17.0	16.0	15.0	8.0	9.0	6.0	13.0

*LOW ALTITUDE: LESS THAN 3/10 CLOUD COVER AT 3,000 FEET

*HIGH ALTITUDE: LESS THAN 3/10 OVERALL CLOUD COVER

TOP SECRET Handle via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels Only

USIB VIEW ON WEATHER PROBLEM

- A COMPARISON OF USIB REQUIREMENTS WITH THE EXPECTED DAYS OF SUITABLE WEATHER FOR RECONNAISSANCE OVER NORTH VIETNAM INDICATES THAT WE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE ABLE TO MEET THEM IN ALL AREAS FOR ALL PERIODS OF THE YEAR BY HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE ALONE. DURING PERIODS OF WORST CLIMATOLOGY, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE BELOW CLOUD LEVEL OR BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE WEATHER DEGRADATION TO THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE

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**SATISFACTION OF
RECONNAISSANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SOUTH OF 19°N.

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COVERAGE OF AIRFIELDS
1 NOV-28 FEB

<u>WEEKLY (17)</u>	<u>TIMES COVERED</u>	<u>LAST USABLE COVERAGE</u>
HANOI GIA LAM	3	28 FEB 69
KEP	1	11 DEC 68 *
PHUC YEN	2	4 FEB 69
	<u>AVG-2</u>	
<u>BI-WEEKLY (8)</u>		
BAI THUONG	4	19 FEB 69
HAIPHONG CAT BI	6	24 FEB 69
DONG SUONG	5	15 FEB 69
HAIPHONG KIEN AN	7	25 JAN 69
YEN BAI	4	27 JAN 69
	<u>AVG-5.2</u>	
<u>MONTHLY (4)</u>		
DIEN BIEN PHU	4	14 FEB 69 *
DONG HOI	18	10 FEB 69
HOA LAC	4	15 FEB 69
LANG SON	2	28 JAN 69
VINH	6	19 FEB 69
	<u>AVG-6.8</u>	

*COVERED SINCE MARCH 1

SECRET

HAIPHONG PORT

REQUIREMENT -

- **COVERAGE ONCE WEEKLY**

STATUS -

- **TOTAL AND PARTIAL COVERAGE ACQUIRED ABOUT 20 TIMES SINCE 1 NOV 68. HOWEVER, TARGET COMPLETELY COVERED WITH HIGH QUALITY, CLOUD FREE PHOTOGRAPHY ONLY FIVE TIMES DURING THIS PERIOD.**

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SAM SITES

REQUIREMENT -

- **COVERAGE ONCE MONTHLY OF 185
ACTIVE SITES**

STATUS -

- **REQUIREMENT SATISFIED IN HANOI-
HAIPHONG AREA. CURRENT RECONN-
AISSANCE EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARD
ACQUISITION OF VHR COVERAGE OF
MODIFIED FAN SONG RADARS.**

SECRET

ELECTRIC POWER FACILITIES

- **REQUIREMENT** - COVERAGE ONCE MONTHLY OF 16 INSTALLATIONS (DAMAGED OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION).
- **STATUS** - IN MOST INSTANCES, THESE INSTALLATIONS PHOTOGRAPHED ADEQUATELY ONLY ONCE SINCE 1 NOV 68.

SECRET

RAIL INSTALLATIONS

- **REQUIREMENT -** COVERAGE ONCE WEEKLY
- **STATUS -** GS MISSIONS IN JAN 69 PROVIDED THE ONLY COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE OF RAIL NET SINCE 1 NOV 68. LIMITED DRONE COVERAGE ACQUIRED OF SELECTED SEGMENTS.


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**SATISFACTION OF
RECONNAISSANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

NORTH OF 19°N.

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SECRET

LOGISTIC ACTIVITY

1 NOV-28 FEB

PHASE I (NOV)

**INITIAL HEAVY SURGE OF SUPPLIES SOUTHWARD
PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON, ESTABLISHED LOGISTIC
NET, EXCEPT FOR COASTAL SHIPMENTS**

PHASE II (NOV-FEB)

**CONTINUED HEAVY FLOW OF SUPPLIES
SOUTHWARD_ RESTRUCTURING AND
REHABILITATION OF LOGISTIC NET WITH
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW TRANSSHIPMENT POINTS
AND EMPHASIS ON RAIL AND WATER
TRANSPORTATION**

PHASE III (FEB)

**INDICATIONS OF STABILIZATION OF SUPPLY
FLOW AND CONTINUED LONGER TERM
IMPROVEMENTS OF LOGISTIC NET**